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I. Introduction
For almost three decades, economists have focused on the question how earnings are transmitted from one generation to the next. The degree to which an individual's income is affected by her parents' income is seen as a norm to evaluate the societal capability to provide equality of economic opportunity. A rich literature exists for the U.S., Great Britain, and the Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, some evidence has been provided for Canada, South Africa, Malaysia, Germany, and France (for an overview see Solon 1999 Solon , 2002 . For the first time, this paper analyses intergenerational income mobility in Switzerland. Empirical research has already shown that Switzerland is characterized by strong immobility in the transmission of education. In a cross-national OECD study (OECD 2002) , parental influence is highest in Switzerland for a child's educational attainment across 31 other countries (Zahner 2005) . 1 As education is probably the major mediating factor of mobility (Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002) , it is to be expected that the intergenerational income transmission should also be very high in
Switzerland.
In addition and analogous to Bauer and Riphahn (2005, 2006) , who compared the educational transmission process for Switzerland between natives and immigrants, I identify differences in the intergenerational income transmission between natives and immigrants. This aspect has barely received attention in the literature of parent-child mobility. 2 Typically, the intergenerational transmission process is considered to be identical for all individuals within a society. This is astonishing since different economists have already pointed out that a person's ethnic affiliation matters in determining her future labor market success (e.g. see Borjas 1993). Ethnicity might show the relevance of culture in the intergenerational transmission process. The relevance of ethnic differences in the equality of opportunity must not be underestimated. At present, almost every Western country is confronted with different and heterogeneous waves of immigration. For Switzerland, the share of residents without Swiss citizenship is more than 20 % (BfS 2005) . 3 For the last 50 years, about 70 % of the rise in the Swiss population has been due to immigration (Haug 2002) . Switzerland has always attracted blue collar workers as well as highly skilled immigrants. Blue collar workers are typically 1 For Switzerland, Bauer and Riphahn (2005) have shown that a child's probability to attend an advanced school degree is about eight times higher for a child with highly educated parents compared to a child with badly educated parents. 2 Regarding differences among ethnic groups, Mazumder (2001) finds higher elasticities among blacks compared to whites in the US. Also for Sweden, intergenerational earnings mobility is lower for immigrants in Sweden (Hammarstedt and Palme 2006) . Aydemir et (2006) al. find no differences in the intergenerational earnings elasticities among immigrants compared to native Canadians. 3 The share of foreign born residents is similar.
handicapped by low education, poor language skills, and few economic opportunities in the job market.
The investigation of the impact of ethnicity on the intergenerational transmission is important as it shows how these differences in opportunities among immigrants change from one generation to the next, i.e. it shows whether a society is able to provide equality of opportunity for disadvantaged ethnic groups. This might inform policy decisions to diminish future disparity.
Studies of intergenerational income transmission typically measure the correlation between a son's and his father's income which requires data that includes both sons' as well as fathers'
incomes. Unfortunately, there is no data set including both incomes for Switzerland. Instead, I
use independent samples. In the sons' sample, individuals have reported certain characteristics of their fathers. The fathers' sample contains the same variables. I use these reported characteristics to predict fathers' incomes. Björklund and Jäntti (1997) have already carefully elaborated this approach. For the fathers' sample, they have access to data from a time period when the fathers were actually working. Unfortunately, this is not possible for Switzerland. To generate fathers' income I revert to a sample from a period that differs to the actual fathers' work period. However, I will point out how this biases my results.
Nevertheless, this new empirical approach has two main advantages: First, as I use instruments to predict fathers' life time income, this technique does not require more than a single year for the fathers' income due to the orthogonality assumption between the instruments and the transitory fluctuations of a single year's income. Second, as I am not restricted to match a son with his actual father, I can include any observation from the sons' sample which has provided paternal characteristics. This means that I can include individuals at every age. Some studies (e.g. Grawe 2005) have shown that the measure of intergenerational income transmission is very sensitive to a son's age class. Most studies face the problem that the observed child is very young and neglect that those children with higher life-time incomes experience a higher income growth later in their lifes. The resulting measurement error of the child's life time income leads to a downward bias of the intergenerational correlation (see Solon 2002 , Bound et. al. 1994 . As I do not attempt to match sons with their real fathers, I can use the entire age range of the child sample. Thus, my results are not affected by such a downward bias.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section II describes the data and the necessary adjustments due to missing values as well as the correction of the standard errors due to the IV approach with two different data sets. In Section III, I address the regression to the mean model and the intergenerational correlation: Part A illustrates the problem of my empirical approach and works out the resulting bias of the least squares coefficient. In Part B, the results from the least squares estimations are presented. Section IV covers the differences in the intergenerational income transmission across the income distribution: Part A provides background and methods, Part B presents the results. Finally, this paper ends with a conclusion in section V.
II Data and Procedures

A. Data
The data for the sons are taken from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) from the years 1999- Table 2 shows the corresponding father characteristics in the SLFS. 10 In general, the mean of the characteristics in all fathers' subsamples are similar. The sample including only individuals who are observed in 5 different years has a higher mean work income. Also, the share of fathers with an incomplete education or who only completed compulsory school is somewhat smaller than in the other subsamples. I find the strongest differences for the share of individuals with a foreign citizenship. Here, the range is between a share of 13 % (for individuals observed 5 years) up to 27 % (for the subsample with all individuals).
11
8 To evaluate the robustness of my findings, I re-estimated the model for intergenerational income mobility applying different other subgroups. The results are all similar and presented later in the text. 9 A large number of studies of intergenerational mobility uses (up to) 5-years average of annual earnings (see Solon 1999 Solon , 2002 . 10 A number of indicators show substantially different means for the SHP and the SLFS. Thus, it is obvious that fathers' distribution in the SLFS does not correspond to the distribution in the son's sample. As a further test, I weighted the SLFS to generate an identical distribution as in the son's sample. All re-estimates are very similar to the estimates from the unweighted samples.
11 Table A1 in the appendix presents the results from the prediction of fathers' incomes by subsamples of the SLFS.
As the sons did not report the age of their fathers, I deduct the age component from income, Rubin's (1976 Rubin's ( , 1996 formulas. The repeated-imputation estimate a ρ ) is the average of the k coefficients from the k regressions 12 As age is a potent predictor in determining incomes, to filter out the age component strongly reduces a possible measurement error of the resulting coefficient. 13 I used a software by Schafer (Schafer 1997) . Based on a multivariate normal distribution, a system of simultaneous regression models is used in which each variable depends on all others (Schafer and Olsen 1998) . The assumed missingness mechanism is "missing at random" (Rubin 1976 , Little & Rubin 1987 . I apply a large set of dummies for age, the socio-economic status in different forms (ISCO-Index, Wright class index, Swiss socio-economic index), schooling, and the size of the company the individual is working in (in numbers of employees). For the set of the sons, I additionally included different socio-economic status of the fathers (ISCO, Wright class index, Swiss Socio-Economic Status), and their schooling. Using data augmentation (Tanner & Wong, 1987) , I replace the missing values by a set of 5 plausible values. After performing identical analysis on each of the 5 datasets, the results (estimates and standard errors) are combined, using simple rules provided by Rubin (1987) .
The variance is
where B is the between imputation variability
and W is the within-imputation variability
Thus, the adjusted variance (2) is composed of an averaged variance from the son-father regression in the sons' sample (within-variance W) and the dispersion in the different q ρ ) 's resulting from differences in the bootstrapped incomes of the fathers (between-variance B),
i.e. the adaptation of the variance from the estimated coefficients in the fathers' sample.
III. Intergenerational Correlation
A. Bias and measurement error of the least squares coefficient
Following the classical approach, I define the son's long-run income as a function of the father's long-run income si fi i y ρy ε = +
where both si y and fi y are log incomes and measured as deviations from their respective means; i ε is white noise. Now, there are three main measurement problems I am confronted with when analysing the intergenerational income mobility in Switzerland. The first and probably best known in the literature of intergenerational mobility is the non-observability of life-time income. Solon (1992) has shown that using annual income as a proxy for long-run income yields a downwards inconsistency of the least squares estimate ρ . Assuming that the son's and the father's annual income sit y and fit y are defined as sit si sit
and fit fi fit
yearly earnings are assumed to equal long-run earnings plus a transitory fluctuation, sit v for the sons and fit v for the fathers, respectively. As the variance of the fathers' transitory fluctuation appears in the denominator of the least squares estimator, the true parameter is underestimated. Solon (1992) has pointed out that if annual income is available for several years, the inconsistency can be reduced:
The higher the number of yearly incomes T that approximate the life-time income, the less fi Var(ν ) , and the less underestimated is the resulting income correlation.
The second problem results from the non-availability of the fathers' yearly earnings. As I have no data on the fathers' annual incomes, but observe only some characteristics of the fathers, I assume that fi y is described by the following equation
where the variance of fi y , the fathers' life-time income, is
X is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a coefficient vector and fi u the stochastic term that can not be explained by the characteristics fi X . If fi X completely explains the fathers' life-time income, fi u would be zero. Following Björklund and Jäntti (1993) , the resulting estimate of ρ has the following probability limit:
Compared to the unbiased least squares estimator of ρ , the numerator of equation (11) 14 will be reduced by the covariance between the sons life-time income and fi u . The denominator will be reduced as the variance of the predicted father's income
Björklund and Jäntti (1997) have provided one example where expression (11) overestimates the true ρ .
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The third problem when analysing intergenerational income transmission in Switzerland is new in the mobility literature. I can not use a fathers' sample from the correct period, i.e.
when fathers were really working. Instead, I use a sample from a period that probably differs from the fathers' actual work period. Fortunately, I can in large parts adopt the empirical procedure by Björklund and Jäntti (1993) and reintegrate this further problem. 16 My point of departure is again equation (9). Substituting equation (8) for fi y into (9) yields
β describes the correlation between the fathers' characteristics and their incomes. As the sample period does not correspond to the fathers' working period, I can not estimate β properly. Instead, my estimation is
where β is the real correlation between the fathers' characteristics and the fathers' income at the time when the fathers were actually working, and γ is the change in time of this correlation from the real working period up to the time when the fathers are observable.
Using least squares, my estimated β ) for calculating the fathers' income has now the following
As the number of observations in the fathers' sample N f is large, then 
s fi X is a matrix containing the fathers' characteristics, reported by the sons.
, and
, and substituting equation (9) into (15) 
And due to the orthogonality assumption
The true fathers' income and the estimated fathers' income differ in two ways: First, unlike fi y , fi y ) contains fi y Δ , the change of the father's income due to a change of the correlation in time between the father's characteristics and the father's long-run income. Also, as the father's characteristics do not cover the complete life-time income, fi y ) does not include fi u , the stochastic component of fi y . The estimation of ρ has now the following probability
It is recognizable that equation (18) contains the same terms as equation (11), the resulting estimator from Björklund and Jäntti (1993) . Further, the bias in equation (18) Unfortunately, we can hardly see in which direction the estimator in equation (20) However, another interesting point is that equation (19) only differs from equation (11) elasticities for Switzerland compared to the elasticities they found for the U.S. and Sweden, a conclusion that mobility is lower in Switzerland would be appropriate.
B. Results from the least squares estimation
I start presenting the estimated elasticities using OLS. Finally, table 3 C shows the different elasticities by age groups of the sons. Similar to the conclusion of Bound et. al. (1994) , the younger the included sons, the stronger intergenerational mobility is biased downwards. Note that table 3 C presents the measures with both age-adjusted incomes for the fathers and for the sons. Even this correction cannot avoid the large measurement error.
IV Measuring differences across the income distribution
A. Background and methods
Using least squares, the elasticity measures the linear correlation between a son's economic status and that of his father's. This measure is important since it describes a society's mobility (1999) and Behrman and Taubman (1990) show the opposite.
I present two different measures to investigate transmission patterns across the income distribution in Switzerland. First, I consider descriptive statistics of the intergenerational income transmission matrices for different subsamples. Then, I apply quantile regression to estimate different elasticitites conditional on the explanatory variables. As described by Koenker and Bassett (1978) or Buchinsky (1998), the model is specified as
Here, θ indicates a specific quantile. Quantile regression allows one to explore intergenerational transmission at different points of the income distribution. It is therefore a useful tool to test whether a son-father income relation is independent of the position in the son's income distribution. As the function is not differentiable at the origin, equation (21) can be solved using linear programming. A simplex algorithm derived by Armstrong et al. (1979) is used. Tables 4 B and C present the probabilities for natives and for immigrants separately. Generally, there is a tendency for a stronger intergenerational persistence among immigrants compared to the Swiss. Given that his father is also in the lowest quartile, a son's probability for staying in the lowest quartile is 44.4% for immigrants and 37.5% for Swiss. On the other side, given a father from the highest quartile, an immigrant's probability to belong to the highest quartile is 41%.
B. Results of the quantile analysis
The equivalent probability for the Swiss is 37%. Considering the sons with respect to their father's citizenship (table 4 D and E), I find that about 39% of all individuals who descend from an immigrant father from the lowest income quantile are in the lowest quartile.
Contrarily, if the father has Swiss citizenship, the probability is about 36%. However, almost 48% of individuals with an immigrant fathers from the highest quartile are also high earners.
The number for individuals with a Swiss father is somewhat lower. Here, the probability is 24 Table 4 F summarizes the ratios of a son's probability to be in the highest quartile to the probability to be in the lowest quartile conditional on the father's income position. Having a father in the lowest income quartile, this ratio is lower for immigrants than for natives. This indicates that the upward mobility for the Swiss is higher than that for the immigrants.
However, I find higher ratios for the immigrants if the father belongs to the highest income quartile. Column 6 of table 4 E directly compares the different ratios between natives and immigrants. Column 7 shows the difference between individuals with a Swiss father to an individual with an immigrant father. Immigrants both have a significant lower upward probability, but also a significant lower downward probability than natives. 26 The overall picture in column 1 is that the estimated coefficients are similar for all quantiles of the sons' income distribution. 27 There is a small rise at the upper end of the income distribution that indicates that the intergenerational mobility is somewhat lower for high earners. The range of the estimated coefficient lies between 0.42 for the 7 th percentile and 0.52 for the 9 th percentile. Starting at the 10 th percentile, the father -son relation rises somewhat up to 0.5 to the third percentile and then declines to the 7 th when it starts rising again to 0.52.
To ease the interpretation, figures 1 A -D illustrate the results graphically. I distinguish between Swiss and immigrants as well as Swiss father and immigrant father respectively.
Each subsample is estimated separately. Immigrants in every income quantile have a higher elasticity than the corresponding natives. I find a somewhat opposite pattern for natives and immigrants. For natives, the highest elasticity is found for sons located in the highest part of income distribution. The lowest part is found at the 75 th quantile. For immigrants, the lowest elasticity is found for sons from the lowest percentile. Conversely, the highest father-son relation is found at the 75 th quantile. The graph of sons with a native father runs somewhat flatly. This indicates that parental inheritance is similar for all income quantiles. For individuals with an immigrant father, the elasticity declines at the tails of the income distribution. Fathers' income is most important for the sons' income at the third quartile.
Generally, while the curve for the Swiss is flat, the corresponding curve for the immigrants indicates a variation in the importance of the fathers' income to the sons' income among different quantiles. I find strongest differences for sons with an immigrant father.
28 Finally, Table 6 shows the reduction of the intergenerational coefficients due to the inclusion of education as a control in the quantile regression. The educational impact is strongest for those quantiles with the highest elasticities. While the natives have a mean reduction of the coefficients of about 37%, the average decrease for immigrants is 43% and 46% for individuals with an immigrant father.
How can we interpret these results for Switzerland? As discussed in section V, differences in the intergenerational mobility across quantiles of the income distribution might be explained by the credit constraints hypothesis (Becker and Tomes 1986): the intergenerational transmission will be higher for those who suffer more from capital market constraints and therefore for those who cannot invest in their children adequately. Regarding the Swiss, fathers' incomes are equally important for all sons' income quantiles. Hence with a mean elasticity of 0.39, Switzerland seems to provide equality of opportunity equally across the income distribution, at least for the natives. Focusing on education as a strong indicator for a child's human capital, these similar intergenerational coefficients across different quantiles for Switzerland might become quite explainable. In contrast to other countries -e.g. the United States -education is publicly financed and Switzerland provides a public schooling system that enjoys a very high reputation. The public school is generally preferred to private institutions, even by the upper class. A good education is not dependant on parental financial effort. This also holds true for tertiary education. All Swiss universities have low and stable tuition fees. 29 Thus, the Swiss schooling system assists in particular low earning families who cannot afford to invest in their child's education. This might be the reason why I do not find a similar pattern as Eide and Showalter (1999) for the U.S. and Bratberg et. al. (2005) for Norway. They all found a stronger intergenerational income correlation for sons at the bottom of the income distribution.
It remains the question why there are some differences in the intergenerational mobility across the income distribution for the immigrants and for individuals with an immigrant father. Besides a mean elasticity of about 0.59 indicating that they suffer from a significantly higher intergenerational persistence compared to the Swiss, there is also strong heterogeneity
28 Table A2 and figures A1 A -D in the appendix present the quantile regression with a control for education. Again, I distinguish between Swiss and immigrants as well as individuals with a Swiss and an immigrant father respectively. Almost all differences in the sons' income quantile have disappeared. Thus, education is a very powerful factor in reducing heterogeneity in the intergenerational income transmission across the income distribution. 29 The average tuition is 1400 CHF per year without any other costs. Children with parents under a certain income level will be financially assisted by the government, regardless of their schooling performance.
across different quantiles of immigrants. Probably, these differences first of all reflect heterogeneity among different ethnic groups. However, an additional explanation could be that a certain number of these immigrants do not have appropriate human capital investment due to a different schooling system in their country of origin. This can be accentuated if education is a stronger signal to evaluate immigrants than natives as other factors like behavior, adaptability or mentality of immigrants might by unknown or at least misunderstood in the host country. Thus, those who are able to send the (host country's) right signal will be preferred to those who are not able to do that. This might explain why some non-natives have obviously less equality of opportunity than others. Nevertheless, as I find highest intergenerational mobility at the lower end of the income distribution among immigrants, Switzerland seems to provide equality of opportunity for low earners among immigrants.
V Conclusion
The number of countries for which the intergenerational income and earnings transmission has been investigated in the literature is still small. This paper tries contribute to this literature by delivering results for Switzerland, a country that has not been analysed yet regarding income mobility.
But, what can we learn from this study? As described in section III, due to methodological differences to other papers, a comparison with other countries must be drawn very cautiously.
If some weak assumptions hold, the presented coefficients can be compared to the results presented by Björklund and Jäntti (1993) which can be regarded as a lower bound. In that case, intergenerational income mobility is lower for Switzerland compared to Sweden.
However, using descriptive quartile transition matrices, the Swiss immobility indexindicating a country's degree of immobility -can be compared to results from Blanden (2005) who analysed intergenerational mobility for four different countries. The Swiss value lies between the corresponding indices for West Germany and the U.S. which is the higher one (whereas the UK and Canada both have smaller values than Switzerland). Thus, although this study can only shed some light on a cross-national comparison, Switzerland tends not to belong to those countries that provide high levels of equality of opportunity.
A within-country comparison across subgroups of the Swiss population shows strong differences between Swiss and immigrants. With an intergenerational income elasticity of 0.55, immigrants tend to be substantially more immobile than Swiss with an elasticity of 0.38.
Also, substantial heterogeneity is found among different ethnic groups. The son-father relation is strongest for immigrants from Spain, Portugal, and Italy which have typically been countries of origin of blue collar guest workers in Switzerland. The smallest elasticity is found for those from Germany and South East Europe. Controlled for education, there is an overall reduction of the mobility-coefficient by about 40%. Generally, the impact of education on the intergenerational transmission seems to be negatively related to the level of education of a specific ethnic group. Thus, heterogeneity in the income mobility among ethnicities can in large parts be eliminated by an appropriate educational investment.
Analysing differences across the income distribution, immigrants have a significantly lower upward as well as downward mobility than natives. Intergenerational income elasticities conditional on the sons' income quantile are similar for natives across the income distribution.
There are somewhat higher elasticities at the lower as well as at the higher end. In contrast, an opposite structure is found for immigrants. Here, mobility is higher at the tails of the income distribution whereas highest elasticity is found for sons in the 75th quantile. These patterns for Switzerland are in conflict with previous results from other countries who either find highest mobility among high-earning or low-earning families. Also, the conclusion from previous studies (e.g. Eide and Showalter 1999) that education is more valuable at the bottom of the earnings distribution can not be supported in this study. Education seems simply to be the mechanism to reduce heterogeneity in intergenerational mobility across the income distribution and its impact is not conditional on a certain income quantile. Note: Description from the SHP 1999 -2003 before multiple imputation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Individuals were grouped by their nationality and the parents' nationality respectively. The group of the Swiss only includes individuals with a Swiss nationality whose parents' both only have a Swiss passport. Immigrants are those who have a foreign nationality or those who have at least one parent with a foreign nationality. South Eastern Europe contains immigrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece.
. Note: * inclusive armed force. Description from the SHP 1999 -2003 before multiple imputation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Individuals were grouped by their nationality and the parents' nationality respectively. The group of the Swiss only includes individuals with a Swiss nationality whose parents' both only have a Swiss passport. Immigrants are those who have a foreign nationality or those who have at least one parent with a foreign nationality. South Eastern Europe contains immigrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece. Note: Description from the SHP 1999 -2003 before multiple imputation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Individuals were grouped by their nationality and the parents' nationality respectively. The group of the Swiss only includes individuals with a Swiss nationality whose parents' both only have a Swiss passport. Immigrants are those who have a foreign nationality or those who have at least one parent with a foreign nationality. South Eastern Europe contains immigrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece. 
